

NSC BRIEFING

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21 DECEMBER 1955

ASSESSMENT OF BULGANIN-KHRUSHCHEV JUNKET

- I. Kremlin probably estimates that 13,000 mil, 31-day B/K junket achieved net victory for Soviet policy, and ^{WAS} definite step forward in softening-up non-Communist area of Asia.
 - A. They believe they have opened area's doors wide to closer cultural, economic ties.
 - B. Politically, they will now expect fence-sitting governments of Asia to give more support to Communist positions in East-West struggle.
 - C. Now have better reason to expect success in whittling away at Western influence in South Asia.
 - D. Have created aura of respectability for local Communists, as champions of Asian self-interest, on-the-spot proponents of co-existence.

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- E. B and K feel they made numerous friends with their cheap and popular allusions to Goa, Kashmir, Pushtoonistan.
- II. In our own assessment, too, Soviets chalked ^{WIN} up in this round.
- A. All Asian countries visited, some others as well, are now convinced they can do business with USSR.
- B. Further formalization of Soviet entree to trade, technical assistance fields in Burma, Afghanistan, India, has paved way for extension such contacts.
- C. B and K succeeded in strengthening Asian leaders' inclination to favor neutralism as safe-and-sure policy.
1. Even in Pakistan, which took kicked in teeth from B & K, view being expressed that it's better to be neutral than friend of US.
- II. Soviet win not entirely lopsided, however.

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A. Khrushchev diatribes resulted in sober second thoughts by Indian, Burmese government leaders, intelligentsia, press.

B. Uninhibited anti-Western performance also beneficial cold-water shock to those in West who have been befuddled by Soviet exploitation "Geneva Spirit."